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TORTS -AUTOMOBILE
OWNER WHO LEAVES
IGNITION UNLOCKED NOT LIABLE FOR INJURY
CAUSED BY NEGLIGENT DRIVING OF THIEF
The plaintiffs were injured when they were struck by the defendants'
automobile, which was being negligently driven by an unauthorized third
person. The vehicle had been taken while left unattended with the
ignition unlocked in violation of a municipal and a county ordinance. t
The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, with prejudice, for'
failure to state a cause of action. On appeal, held, affirmed: the failure
of the defendants to comply with the ordinances was not the proximate
cause of the plaintiffs' injuries, which were due solely to the negligent
operation of the vehicle by the unauthorized driver. Lingefelt v. Hanner,
125 So.2d 325 (Fla. App. 1960).
With this decision of first impression, 2 Florida has adopted the
majority view. The decisions on this point are numerous, and the factual
situations vary but slightly; yet, the holdings are diametrically opposed.
In the majority of cases, little or no attempt has been made to distinguish
contrary decisions. The Illinois Supreme Court has stated the conflict
to be "that the majority rule seems to hold there is no liability while
the minority rule holds there is.":I
The courts which accept the rule of non-liability base their decisions,
for the most part, 4 on the theory that a wilful, malicious, or criminal
1. MIAMI, FLA., CODE OF METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, FLA. cl. 38, art. VI,
§ 155 (1957):
No person driving or in charge of any motor vehicle shall permit it
to stand unattended without first stopping the engine, locking the
ignition and removing the key. No vehicle shall be permitted to stand
upon any perceptible grade, without stopping the engine and effectively
setting the brake thereon, and turning the front wheels to the curb
or side of the street.
DADE COUNTY, FLA., METROPOLITAN ORDINANCES cl.
57-12, § 6.01 (1957):
No person driving or in charge of any motor vehicle shall permit it to
stand unattended without first stopping the engine, locking the ignition
and removing the key. No vehicle shall be permitted to stand unattended
upon any perceptible grade, without stopping the engine and effectively
setting the brake thereon, and turning the front wheels to the curb or
side of the street.
2. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, in Bryant v.Atlantic
Car Rental, Inc., 127 So.2d 910 (Fla. App. 1961), has more recently held the owner
of the automobile not liable. Although no ordinance was violated in that case, the
court favorably cited Lingefelt v. Hanner.
3. Ney v. Yellow Cal) Co., 2 111. 2d 74, 77, 117 N.E.2d 74, 77 (1954).
4. Several jurisdictions support the view that not only is there no proximate cause,
but also there is no duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. In the absence of
statute or ordinance, it is generally held that a driver has no duty to protect others
from the actions of thieves who steal his car. E.g., Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d
60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954); Kiste v. Red Cab, Inc., 122 Ind. App. 587, 106 N.E.2d 395
(1952); Castay v. Katz & Besthoff, Ltd., 148 So. 76 (La. App. 1933). Some
jurisdictions, with similar statutes or ordinances, discuss the duty imposed upon the
owner, holding liability to a third person to be clearly beyond the scope of that duty.
E.g., Liberto v. Holfeldt, 221 Md. 62, 155 A.2d 698 (1959); Corinti v. Wittkopp,
355 Mich. 170, 93 N.W.2d 906 (1959); Clements v. Tashioin, 168 A.2d 472
(R.I. 1961).
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act breaks the chain of causation.5 This theory is applied although the
defendant's negligent conduct created the situation which gave the third
person the opportunity to commit the tort. When the negligence of one
person is merely passive and potential, and the negligence of another
is the moving and effective cause of the injury, the latter is the proximate
cause.6 The passive negligence is not the proximate cause because it
was not foreseeable that the thief would be involved in an accident.7 The
negligent injury of the plaintiff by the thief is a consequence too remote
to have been reasonably within the contemplation of the defendant when
he left his vehicle unattended, and the intervening act of the thief is
sufficient to break the sequence of defendant's negligence so as to
establish the thief's act as the efficient cause of the accident.8
This is the view subscribed to by the majority in Lingefelt v. Hanner:9
We believe it is grounded in reason and logic, and align ourselves
with this view. The act of appellee in negligently leaving the
ignition switch of his automobile unlocked may have been the
proximate cause of the unauthorized taking, but the appellants'
injuries were due solely to the negligent operation, by an unauthorized person, of appellee's automobile.1 0
While it is true that causation is normally a question of fact for
a jury to decide, nevertheless, when the facts are not disputed and it
is certain that reasonable minds could draw but one inference from
such facts, the issue may be resolved as a matter of law.' By this
reasoning, the majority of courts have taken the issue of proximate cause
from the jury.
5. Midkiff v. Watkins, 52 So.2d 573 (La. App. 1951) (no statute violated);
Anderson v. Theisen, 231 Minn. 369, 43 N.W.2d 272 (1950) (plaintiff injured by
negligence of thief in flight from scene of theft); Permenter v. Milner Chevrolet Co.,
229 Miss. 385, 91 So.2d 243 (1956), 12 U. MIAMI L. REV. 120 (1957); RESTATEMENT,
TORTS

§ 448 (1934).

6. Corinti v. Wittkopp, 355 Mich. 170, 93 N.W.2d 906 (1959) (property
damage caused by negligent driving of youthful thief in attempt to elude police).
7. Liberto v. Holfeldt, 221 Md. 62, 155 A.2d 698 (1959) (injury caused to
plaintiff by negligent driving of thief five days after the defendant's automobile was
stolen).
8. Kiste v. Red Cab, Inc., 122 Ind. App. 587, 106 N.E.2d 395 (1952); Castay
v. Katz & Besthoff, Ltd., 148 So. 76 (La. App. 1933) (automobile stolen from New
Orleans street during Mardi Gras, but no statute violated); Midkiff v. Watkins,
52 So.2d 573 (La. App. 1951); Liberto v. IHolfeldt, supra note 6; Corinti v. Wittkopp,
355 Mich. 170, 93 N.W.2d 906 (1959); Anderson v. Theisen, 231 Minn. 369,
43 N.W.2d 272 (1950); Permenter v. Milner Chevrolet Co., 229 Miss. 385, 91
So.2d 243 (1956); Teague v. Pritchard, 38 Tenn. App. 686, 279 S.W.2d 706 (1954).
In Galbraith v. Levin, 323 Mass. 255, 81 N.E.2d 560 (1948), the defendant violated
the statute requiring him to register his vehicle, but the court based its decision
on two prior cases, Slater v. T. C. Baker Co., 261 Mass. 424, 158 N.E. 778 (1927)
and Sullivan v. Griffin, 318 Mass. 359,' 61 N.E.2d 330 (1945), in which the statute
violated by the respective defendants was one prohibiting the parking of an automobile
and leaving it unattended with the ignition unlocked.
9. 125 So.2d 325 (Fla. App. 1960).
10. Id. at 327.
11. Liberto v. Holfeldt, 221 Md. 62, 155 A.2d 698 (1959); Lingefelt v. Hanner,
125 So.2d 325 (Fla. App. 1960).
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The minority view holds the question of liability to be one of fact.
The leading case in support of this view is Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 12
in which a cab, left unattended on a Chicago street in violation of a
statute, was stolen. After ruling that the purpose of the statute was
to promote safety, the court noted the increase in the power and number
of vehicles, the growth in population, and the developing rate of automobile
accidents as well as juvenile delinquency. From this background, the
court concluded:
must come a recognition of the probable danger of resulting
injury consequent to permitting a motor vehicle to become easily
available to an unauthorized
person through violation of the
3
statute in question.'
Reasonable minds may differ since different courts have held different
ways. 14 Different facts and circumstances in a particular case might be
determinative of liability or non-liability. 15 Therefore, the question should
be one for the jury. 16
Although most courts which follow the minority view hold the
question of liability to be for the trier of fact, the District of Columbia
went one step further in Ross v. Hartman,17 and held, as a matter of
law, that the owner was liable to the plaintiff injured by the thief's
negligent driving. The court reasoned that an unlocked ignition creates
the risk that meddling by children or thieves will result in injuries to
the public, and the ordinance was intended to prevent these consequences.
Since it was a safety measure, its violation was negligence which created
the hazard .and brought about the harm which the ordinance was intended
to prevent. The conduct of the defendant created the risk that a third
person would act improperly. The fact that a third person did* so act
12. 2 111. 2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1954). The Illinois Supreme Court thus settled
a conflict which had existed between the First and Third District Appellate Courts.
In Ostergard v. Frisch, 333 111.App. 359, 77 N.E.2d 537 (1948), the First District
Appellate Court had held, in a similar situation, that there was liability. In Cockrell
v. Sullivan, 344 111. App. 620, 101 N.E.2d 878 (1951), the Third District Appellate
Court held there was no liability. One year after the Cockrell case was decided, the
First District reaffirmed its stand in the Ostergard case in Ncy v. Yellow Cab Co.,
348 Ill. App. 161, 108 N.E.2d 508 (1952), and appeal to the supreme court was
granted on the ground of importance.
13. Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 111. 2d 74, 82, 117, N.E.2d 74, 79 (1954).
14. Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 I11.2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1954).
15. Ibid. See Garbo v. Walker, 129 N.E.2d 537 (Ohio C.P. 1955) (the thief in a
burry to get away from the scene of the theft struck the plaintiff).
16. Schaff v. R. W. Claxton, Inc., 79 U.S. App. D.C. 207, 144 F.2d 532
(D.C. Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 871 (1948) (delivery truck parked in parking
space beside restaurant was not violation of ordinance involving parking in a "public
space"); Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., supra note 14; Kass v. Schneiderman, 21 Misc. 2d
518, 197 N.Y.S.2d 979 (New York City Munic. Ct. 1960) (when defendant's
automobile was stolen while he stood beside it, the principal question for the jury
seemed to be whether the automobile was unattended); Garbo v. Walker, 129 N.E.2d
537 (Ohio C.P. 1955).
17. 78 App. D.C. 217, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 790
(1944) (truck with key in ignition parked outside garage waiting to be taken inside for
night storage).
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is not an intelligent reason for excusing the defendant. It is fairer that
he be held responsible for the harm than to deny a remedy to the
innocent victim.
Judge Carroll dissented in the principal case' 8 on the ground that
foreseeability of the theft should be a question for the trier of fact.
The degree of risk that an automobile with an unlocked ignition will be
stolen varies with the circumstances. "The risk reasonably to be perceived
defines the duty to be obeyed."'19
One who takes an automobile under the circumstances of this case
is not necessarily an "unauthorized person," so as to insulate the owner
from liability under the Florida dangerous instrumentality doctrine, if
this "unauthorized" use of the car could reasonably have been foreseen.
The ordinance, based in part on the likelihood that automobiles with
unlocked ignitions will be taken, implies a degree of foresceability of
that result. It follows that if the violation of the ordinance can be
negligence creating a foreseeable risk of theft, and the theft occurs,
resulting in injury to another by the negligent driving of the thief,
then the injury can be said to have been proximately caused by the
negligent act of leaving the automobile unattended with the ignition
20

unlocked .

A holding that the owner is not liable will diminish the vicarious
liability imposed by the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, and "will
the extent that it was
tend to nullify the effect of the ordinance to '21
injury."
or
damage
such
against
guard
to
intended
The question of liability or no liability under these factual situations
seems to present issues incapable of being argued with conviction either
way. To hold the owner liable for his negligence would tend, as suggested
by several courts, 22 to make him an insurer for whomever an unforeseen
thief might injure through a criminal act, which is held by the majority
of courts to be an efficient, intervening cause. Therefore, based upon
this contention, it would seem correct to absolve the owner of liability
as a matter of law.
Yet, it is within reason that there will be times when an injury
such as occurred in the noted case would be easily foreseeable by an
owner who violates a parking ordinance. It follows, then, that the only
way foreseeability can be determined in any given factual situation
is by the trier of fact.
18. Lingefelt v. Hanner, 125 So.2d 325 (Fla. App. 1960).
19. Id. at 327 (dissenting opinion), quoting Cardozo, 1. in Palsgraf v. Long

Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928).

20. Id. at 327-28 (dissenting opinion).
21. Id. at 328 (dissenting opinion).
22. Midkiff v. Watkins, 52 So.2d 573 (La. App. 1951); Sullivan v. Griffin,
318 Mass. 359, 61 N.E.2d 330 (1945); Permenter v. Milner Chevrolet Co., 229

Miss. 385, 91 So.2d 243 (1956).
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The legislative purpose in enacting ordinances or statutes regulating
the manner of parking vehicles is strictly the court's conjecture in most
cases, and the interpretation given more often than not appears to be
one which will support the result the court desires. It is submitted that
if the owner of an automobile is to be held liable to an injured party
for the negligent operation of the vehicle by a thief or other unauthorized
person, it is for the legislature to impose the liability by so stating
in the ordinance or statute, or by making its intent implicitly clear. In
the absence of a clear legislative purpose, the courts should absolve
the owner of the automobile as a matter of law.
The dangerous instrumentality doctrine, raised by Judge Carroll's
dissent, presents a unique contention for holding the owner liable. It is
somewhat doubtful that the Florida courts would apply this doctrine
in a factual situation as portrayed in the principal case,23 but if the
doctrine of imputed negligence is to be extended further to encompass
those drivers using an automobile without authorization, this author is
of the view that it is the legislature's responsibility, not the courts'.
PHILIP N. SMITH

DIVERSITY JURISDICTION-ADMISSIBILITY
OF EVIDENCE AND THE "OUTCOME-DETERMINATIVE"

TEST
The plaintiff-appellee, an assured under a fire insurance policy on
Florida property, sued the defendant-appellant to recover for a fire loss.
In a diversity action in a federal district court in Florida, the defendant tried
to prove that during an examination (which occurred prior to the commencement of litigation), the plaintiff had sworn falsely with the intent to
defraud. If admitted into evidence, the statement not only might have
impeached the testimony of the corporate assured's president, but also
could have constituted the defense of breach of policy.' The federal
district judge refused to admit the statement into evidence on the basis

23. "When an owner authorizes and permits his automobile to be used by another
he is liable in damages for injuries to third persons caused bv the negligent operation
so authorized." (Emphasis added.) Lynch v. Walker, 159 Fla. 188, 194, 31 So.2d
268, 271 (1947). See Judge Carroll's dissent in Leonard v. Susco Car Rental Sys.,
103 So.2d 243 (Fla. App. 1958), 13 U. MIAMI L. REV. 250.
1. American Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 120 Fla. 674, 163 So. 17 (1935); Chaachou
v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 241 F.2d 889 (5th Cir. 1957).

